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“To Hell in a Handbasket”: Teachers, Free Speech, and 
Matters of Public Concern in the Social Media World 
JESSICA O. LAURIN* 
“A complete and utter jerk in all ways. Although academically ok, your child has no 
other redeeming qualities.”1 Natalie Munroe, a Pennsylvania public school teacher, 
blogged this comment as an example of what she would like to write on some of her 
students’ report cards.2 Although her blog was not password protected, Munroe 
claimed that her blog was meant to be for friends only; she only had nine subscrib-
ers.3 But Munroe’s blog—entitled “Where are we going, and why are we in this 
handbasket?”4—generated public outrage after a reporter found the page and brought 
it to the school district’s attention.5 Munroe blogged under the name “Natalie M” and 
did not identify where she worked, where she lived, or her students’ names.6 Some 
of her comments about students, however, were specific. For example, in her post 
“Things From This Day That Bothered Me,” Munroe wrote, “[t]he fact that the jerk 
who was out 3 days around our last major assessment because his family took him 
on [a] trip to Puerto Rico . . . was out again today . . . because his family took him to 
the effing Master’s golf shit over Easter break.”7 
Word of Munroe’s blog spread like wildfire. Students distributed copies of blog 
posts in the hallways, and parents requested that their children not be assigned 
to Munroe’s class¾culminating in the school district’s decision to hire another 
teacher to “shadow” Munroe to accommodate parents’ concerns.8 The national media 
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 1. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 459 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 2. Id. Other proposed comments include: “[c]oncerned your kid is automaton, as she just 
sits there emotionless for an entire 90 minutes, staring into the abyss, never volunteering to 
speak or do anything”; “[t]wo words come to mind: brown AND nose”; “[s]neaking, com-
plaining, jerkoff”; “[j]ust as bad as his sibling. Don’t you know how to raise kids?”; and 
“[d]resses like a street walker.” Id.  
 3. Id. at 458. 
 4. Id. (italics omitted). 
 5. Id. at 461–62. 
 6. Id. at 458.  
 7. Id. at 460. 
 8. Id. at 462. The school district received 200 “opt-out” requests from parents, all of 
which were granted. Id. The teacher “shadow[ing]” Munroe would teach the exact same sched-
ule, and the “shadow” teacher, rather than Munroe, would teach the students who “opt[ed]-
out.” Id.  
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reported on the story,9 and Munroe appeared on several major television stations.10 
During the school year’s last couple of months, Munroe went on her prescheduled 
maternity leave.11 She returned the following school year and received negative per-
formance reviews.12 That June, the school terminated Munroe.13 In response, Munroe 
filed a retaliation action against the school district, the superintendent, and the prin-
cipal, arguing that she was fired because of her blog comments—thus abridging her 
First Amendment rights.14  
Munroe is not alone. A school district in Cohasset, Massachusetts, forced June 
Talvitie-Siple, a supervisor of a high school math and science program, to resign 
after parents discovered her Facebook wall comments describing her students as 
“germ bags” and their parents as “snobby” and “arrogant.”15 Across the country, 
many public school teachers’ social media presence has led to adverse employment 
actions rooted in the public employee free speech doctrine, which considers whether 
the speech is a matter of public concern and balances the employer’s and the em-
ployee’s interests.16  
Given the surge of adverse employment actions connected to social media, it is 
important to note the ubiquity of social media sites. The growing use of Facebook 
and Twitter, two popular forms of social media, is astounding. As of December 2016, 
Facebook had 1.86 billion monthly active users17 and as of June 2016, Twitter had 
313 million monthly active users.18 Perhaps more startling is the number of Facebook 
and Twitter mobile users during these time frames; Facebook had 1.74 billion mobile 
                                                                                                             
 
 9. See, e.g., Andrea Canning & Olivia Katrandjian, Teacher Defends Insulting Blog 
Posts About Her Students: ‘I Hear the Trash Company Is Hiring,’ ABC NEWS (Feb. 16, 2011), 
http://abcnews.go.com/US/pennsylvania-teacher-wrote-insulting-blog-posts-students-suspended 
/story?id=12929001 [https://perma.cc/4937-WH64].  
 10. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 462. 
 11. Id. at 463. 
 12. Id. at 464. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Id.  
 15. Ki Mae Heussner & Dalia Fahmy, Teacher Loses Job After Commenting About Stu-
dents, Parents on Facebook, ABC NEWS (Aug. 19, 2010), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology 
/facebook-firing-teacher-loses-job-commenting-students-parents/story?id=11437248 [https:// 
perma.cc/467J-B8X5].  
 16. See, e.g., Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292 (D. Conn. 2008) (involving a 
teacher’s MySpace comments); In re O’Brien, No. 108–5/11, 2013 WL 132508 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. Jan. 11, 2013) (involving a teacher’s Facebook posts). As time goes on, it is 
likely that even more cases similar to In re O’Brien and Spanierman will reach the courts. See 
Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the First Amendment, 90 
N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1602 (2012). The balancing test is referred to as “the Pickering balance” 
and was established in Pickering v. Board of Education. 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); see infra 
text accompanying notes 45–47. 
 17. Company Info: Stats, FACEBOOK: NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ 
[https://perma.cc/K3H9-ZULS].  
 18. Twitter Usage/Company Facts, TWITTER, https://about.twitter.com/company [https:// 
perma.cc/NR4W-V63B].  
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monthly active users,19 and 82% of Twitter users were active on mobile devices.20 
Given the continuous growth of social media use, it seems that social media will not 
go away any time soon;21 it is inexorably a part of the modern world.22  
Despite its potential problems, online speech can be valuable for teachers because 
of its personal and professional uses.23 On a personal level, social media is used to 
deepen connections and to maintain relationships with others.24 It can be used to unite 
people with common interests who have never met in person.25 Professionally, social 
media allows teachers to communicate with each other and with unions; it also pro-
vides a means to keep up-to-date with teaching techniques.26 But issues can arise 
when students stumble across a teacher’s purely personal speech online.27 Because it 
can be difficult for teachers to insulate their online speech from students, teachers 
may refrain from using social media at all¾thus resulting in a chilling effect upon 
speech that has First Amendment value.28 Even short of total social media abstinence, 
a general fear of using social media may stop teachers from expressing their concerns 
                                                                                                             
 
 19. Company Info: Stats, supra note 17. 
 20. Twitter Usage/Company Facts, supra note 18.  
 21. Just seven years ago, Facebook reported 373 million monthly active users. Eric Eldon, 
Facebook Traffic Reaches Nearly 375 Million Monthly Active Users Worldwide, Led by US, 
ADWEEK (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.adweek.com/socialtimes/facebook-traffic-reaches-nearly 
-375-million-monthly-active-users-worldwide-led-by-us/234992 [https://perma.cc/K72J-52XM].  
 22. See Jonah Berger & Katherine L. Milkman, What Makes Online Content Viral?, 49 J. 
MARKETING RES. 192, 192 (2012) (“Sharing online content is an integral part of modern life.”); 
Emily H. Fulmer, Note, Privacy Expectations and Protections for Teachers in the Internet 
Age, 2010 DUKE L. & TECH. REV. No. 014 ¶¶ 1, 6 (“Social networking websites are part of 
modern American culture.”). While all age groups have increased their social media use over 
time, younger generations use social media more on average. Social Media Fact Sheet, PEW 
RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2017), http://www.pewinternet.org/data-trend/social-media/social-media 
-use-by-age-group/ [https://perma.cc/NQF5-J6SW]. As of November 2016, 86% of adults 
aged eighteen to twenty-nine use social networking sites, compared to ages thirty to forty-nine 
(80%) and ages fifty to sixty-four (64%). Id. Therefore, it is logically inferable that future 
generations—the ones being taught by teachers using the platform—are more likely to uncover 
their teachers’ social media posts. 
 23. See Berger & Milkman, supra note 22, at 193 (“People may share emotionally 
charged content to make sense of their experiences, reduce dissonance, or deepen social 
connections.”). 
 24. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1606–07.  
 25. Id. at 1607. 
 26. Id. at 1606. 
 27. See Amy W. Estrada, Note, Saving Face from Facebook: Arriving at a Compromise 
Between Schools’ Concerns with Teacher Social Networking and Teachers’ First Amendment 
Rights, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 283, 283 (2010) (“Because a teacher’s main objective in using 
a social networking site is not to interact with students, some of their profile content may be 
inappropriate in light of their professional responsibilities.”); see also Papandrea, supra note 
16, at 1608 (arguing that Facebook often poses problems for teachers because “it is difficult 
for users to present multiple personas to different audiences”).  
 28. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1607. Papandrea notes that privacy controls on Facebook 
do not completely alleviate the problem, as privacy settings can be tough to navigate and can 
be bypassed easily. Id. at 1608–09.   
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about valuable topics online. They may hold back or temper their opinions in im-
portant political and social dialogues.29 
The First Amendment protects a public employee’s speech that addresses a matter 
of “public concern,” meaning that the speech is the subject of “legitimate news in-
terest,” or, put another way, “a subject of general interest and of value and concern 
to the public at the time of publication.”30 Thus, categorizing the speech’s content is 
a key part of First Amendment analysis. The varied content of social media posts, 
however, complicates the content inquiry.31 Munroe’s case exemplifies the difficul-
ties when an online poster blurs the personal and professional spheres. Between 
August 2009 and November 2010, Munroe wrote eighty-four blog posts on varying 
subjects. Some posts were school related, centering on Munroe’s coworkers, school 
district administration, and students and their parents, while others were personal, 
focusing on Munroe’s movie preferences, her children, and yoga classes.32 Several 
posts contained both school-related and personal content.33 Given the breadth of top-
ics that even a single post may address, it is difficult to define the content as either a 
matter of public concern or not a matter of public concern. For example, Munroe 
wrote, “The first semester of this school year, when I had a parade of whiny, entitled 
kids run to the guidance department to tell on me for giving them the low grades they 
earned on their shoddy papers, sort of scarred me. I consider myself very fair with 
my grading.”34 Munroe’s words could be viewed either as a mere workplace gripe or 
as part of a broader dialogue on millennials’ attitudes. The latter interpretation is not 
farfetched. In fact, Munroe’s comments fit with what Professor Berenson has as-
serted: “[Millennials] want it all, they want it now, and believe that they deserve it.”35  
The court’s analysis in Munroe exemplifies the difficulties in applying the public 
concern doctrine in the social media context. Through the Munroe case, this Note 
addresses current issues regarding the First Amendment’s public concern require-
ment. Its goal is to highlight tensions within the public concern doctrine and suggest 
how courts should apply the doctrine in the social media context. This Note argues 
that courts should narrow the scope of examined speech and place little weight on 
the amount of media attention that the speech received. Although courts sometimes 
                                                                                                             
 
 29. See id. at 1607 (“To avoid the problems of controlling the audience for their infor-
mation, some teachers simply . . . engage in significant self-censorship to post only the most 
benign content.”). 
 30. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). The public concern 
requirement is a prerequisite to reach the balancing test established in Pickering v. Board of 
Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), which balances the employee’s interest in speech and the 
employer’s interest in efficiency. Roe, 543 U.S. at 82.  
 31. See infra text accompanying notes 74, 98. 
 32. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 33. An example is a post entitled, “Things From This Day That Bothered Me.” Id. at 460. 
It contained both of the following complaints: (1) “[t]he fact that several students in 3rd block 
did a lame job on their easy assignment today,” and (2) “[t]he new chick who seems to be on 
or near my elliptical all the damn time.” Id. 
 34. Id. at 461. Another example is Munroe’s comment that “this new-aged soft-on-
crime/bribery and overindulgence is probably the reason that kids are so horrible today.” Id. 
 35. Steven K. Berenson, Educating Millennial Law Students for Public Obligation, 1 
CHARLOTTE L. REV. 51, 54 (2008).  
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reject First Amendment protection on the Pickering balancing test instead of the pub-
lic concern issue, the public concern requirement is a threshold issue that plays a 
critical role in successful First Amendment claims.36 Accordingly, courts need to re-
visit the public concern doctrine to ensure that its analysis is sound and yields the 
correct outcome. 
Part I provides background concerning retaliation claims, criticism of the public 
concern requirement, and special issues that teachers face in the social media world.37 
Part II identifies current issues with how courts apply the public concern doctrine.38 
Finally, Part III suggests the best way to apply the public concern doctrine to address 
problems unique to social media speech.39  
I. RETALIATION AND TEACHERS’ VULNERABILITIES  
This Part explains how the public concern requirement fits into the public em-
ployee free speech doctrine and into employment retaliation claims.40 It also ad-
dresses how public school teachers face unique problems when pursuing successful 
retaliation claims.41  
A. The First Amendment and Retaliation Claims 
Public employees, like all citizens, have free speech rights under the First Amend-
ment.42 Thus, “a State may not discharge an employee on a basis that infringes that 
employee’s constitutionally protected interest in freedom of speech.”43 To succeed 
in a retaliation claim, therefore, a public employee must first demonstrate that his or 
her speech was protected under the First Amendment.44 Courts have long recognized 
that a public employer’s interest in maintaining efficient performance sometimes 
conflicts with the free speech rights of its employees.45 This recognition led to a spe-
cial free speech doctrine for public employees developed in Pickering v. United 
                                                                                                             
 
 36. See infra text accompanying note 49; infra note 68 and accompanying text.  
 37. See infra Part I.  
 38. See infra Part II.  
 39. See infra Part III.  
 40. See infra Part I.A.  
 41. See infra Part I.B.  
 42. See, e.g., Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (recognizing that teach-
ers have First Amendment rights, although the rights are somewhat restricted). When a teacher 
speaks online, the balance between the school’s and the teacher’s respective interests may tend 
to tip toward the school; the speed at which online speech is spread may augment the disrup-
tion that the school seeks to avoid. See Heussner & Fahmy, supra note 15 (“The fact that [the 
speech is] online makes it more easily findable and have a broader potential impact.” (quoting 
Jonathan Ezor, Assistant Professor of Law and Technology at Touro Law Center)).  
 43. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383 (1987) (citing Perry v. Sindermann, 408 
U.S. 593, 597 (1972)).  
 44. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014).  
 45. See, e.g., Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. Further, when public employees speak on mat-
ters related to the workplace, they are in the position to hinder governmental functioning. 
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419 (2006). 
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States, where a teacher was terminated for his letter to a local newspaper that criti-
cized the school board’s handling of prior tax proposals.46 The Pickering test bal-
ances an employer’s interests in efficiency and the employee’s interest in free 
speech.47  
The Pickering Court articulated the employee’s interest narrowly: the employee’s 
interest “as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern.”48 Two subse-
quent United States Supreme Court cases refined the public employee free speech 
doctrine. First, Connick v. Myers established that the employee’s speech must be 
about a matter of public concern before the court even reaches the Pickering bal-
ance.49 According to the Connick Court, whether speech is a matter of public concern 
“must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as re-
vealed by the whole record.”50 A matter of public concern is “a subject of legitimate 
news interest,” meaning “a subject of general interest and of value and concern to 
the public at the time of publication.”51 Second, the Court in Garcetti v. Ceballos 
held that public employees do not receive First Amendment protection when they 
“make statements pursuant to their official duties” because public employees do not 
speak in their capacity as citizens in such situations.52  
In addition to showing that the First Amendment protects his or her speech, the 
public employee must also show that there was a causal connection between the 
                                                                                                             
 
 46. 391 U.S. at 564–65.  
 47. Id. at 568.  
 48. Id. Later, the Court in Connick v. Myers explicitly stated why not every form of gov-
ernment speech should be a matter a public concern: “When employee expression cannot be 
fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other concern to the commu-
nity, government officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their offices, without intru-
sive oversight by the judiciary in the name of the First Amendment.” 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). 
Further, the Court was concerned that considering all government speech a matter of public 
concern would open the floodgates to constitutional causes of action. Id. at 149. “While as a 
matter of good judgment, public officials should be receptive to constructive criticism offered 
by their employees, the First Amendment does not require a public office to be run as a 
roundtable for employee complaints over internal office affairs.” Id.  
 49. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 146 (“Pickering, its antecedents, and its progeny lead us to 
conclude that if Myers’ questionnaire cannot be fairly characterized as constituting speech on 
a matter of public concern, it is unnecessary for us to scrutinize the reasons for her dis-
charge.”). But see Frances E. Faircloth, Note, Freedom of Speech and Government Employees: 
A Reasonable Test for the Digital Age, 6 J. MARSHALL L.J. 55, 66–67 (2012) (arguing that 
Connick did not, in fact, institute the public concern question as a threshold issue). The Court 
in Connick arguably stated the opposite: “We do not suggest, however, that Myers’ speech, 
even if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of the 
First Amendment.” Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. Nevertheless, courts have interpreted Connick 
as establishing the requirement of public concern as a threshold issue; therefore, it is now 
recognized as such. See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 418 (designating that the question of 
whether or not the employee speech is a matter of public concern is the first question in deter-
mining whether or not the speech is protected).  
 50. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48.  
 51. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 52. Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421.   
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alleged retaliatory action and the protected speech.53 If the public employee satisfies 
these elements, the government may avoid liability by showing that it would have 
taken the same employment action even if the employee had never spoken.54 
B. Special Issues with Teachers 
Teachers are especially vulnerable to employer retaliation when the school finds 
that their social media posts are improper. As one scholar has noted, teachers using 
social media “have faced severe punishments for posting content that school officials 
claim interferes with a school’s educational mission, sets a bad example for students, 
or is otherwise inappropriate or unprofessional.”55 While all areas of public 
employment have expectations of professionalism, teachers have always been held 
to a high standard.56 The main reason for this is that public school teachers have 
ample opportunities to influence children and their development.57  
Although social media cases highlight society’s high expectations for teachers, 
our expectations existed long before social media became popular.58 Near our na-
tion’s founding, community schools had a heavy Protestant presence that emphasized 
morality.59 Even with a diminished religious emphasis long after the founding, strict 
regulations persisted in schools. For example, rules from the early twentieth century 
prohibited unmarried women teachers from wearing fewer than two petticoats60 and 
from “keep[ing] company with men.”61 Moral expectations persisted into the mid-
twentieth century when states allowed school boards to terminate or suspend teacher 
licenses for immoral behavior.62  
Today, teachers are held to high standards offline and on social media.63 As social 
                                                                                                             
 
 53. See, e.g., Dougherty v. Sch. Dist., 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014); Spanierman v. 
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 308 (D. Conn. 2008).  
 54. Dougherty, 772 F.3d at 986; Spanierman, 576 F. Supp. 2d at 308. 
 55. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1604. 
 56. See Lumturije Akiti, Note, Facebook Off Limits? Protecting Teachers’ Private 
Speech on Social Networking Sites, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 119, 148 (2012). 
 57. See Rachel A. Miller, Note, Teacher Facebook Speech: Protected or Not?, 2011 BYU 
EDUC. & L.J. 637, 637 (stating that teachers are “mentors, coaches, and examples for the na-
tion’s youth”). 
 58. See generally Angela Lumpkin, Teachers as Role Models Teaching Character and 
Moral Virtues, J. PHYSICAL EDUC. RECREATION & DANCE, Feb. 2008, at 45, 45.  
 59. John E. Rumel, Beyond Nexus: A Framework for Evaluating K–12 Teacher Off-Duty 
Conduct and Speech in Adverse Employment and Licensure Proceedings, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 
685, 688–89 (2015).  
 60. Fulmer, supra note 22, ¶ 28. 
 61. Alexander Wohl, Oiling the Schoolhouse Gate: After Forty Years of Tinkering with 
Teachers’ First Amendment Rights, Time for a New Beginning, 58 AM. U. L. REV. 1285, 1317 
(2009). 
 62. Rumel, supra note 59, at 689–90. Rumel cites examples persisting into the twenty-
first century, such as legislation in the California Education Code. Id. at 690 n.29.  
 63. Miller, supra note 57, at 639 (“While parents and communities may want their stu-
dents’ teachers to set a high example, teachers are average people that go to parties (sometimes 
where alcohol is served) and rant out their frustrations of work or school to their friends (oc-
casionally in unpleasant terms).”).  
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media proliferates, we will likely see more and more teachers suffer adverse 
employment actions due to their online speech.64 Because many teachers understand 
that posting online may jeopardize their jobs, there is the risk that they may refrain 
from speaking online altogether.65 
II. CURRENT ISSUES WITHIN THE PUBLIC CONCERN DOCTRINE 
The public concern requirement articulated in Connick has been widely criticized, 
particularly within the social media context.66 Because the Supreme Court has not 
addressed social media specifically, current precedent does not provide clear guide-
lines for when social media speech will meet the public concern requirement.67 Ad-
ditionally, acute focus on public concern as a threshold requirement often precludes 
courts from ever reaching the Pickering balance of government and employee inter-
ests in the first place, effectively eliminating the balancing test from the equation.68 
Another criticism is that speech on social media often implicates both matters of 
public concern and purely private speech, thus increasing the difficulty of its proper 
classification.69  
Perhaps because the public concern test can be difficult to apply, recent court 
decisions—the latest being Munroe70—have dodged a full assessment of the issue 
and have instead relied on the Pickering balance to dispose of the case.71 The Munroe 
                                                                                                             
 
 64. See Snyder v. Millersville University, No. 07-1660, 2008 WL 5093140 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 
3, 2008), for an example. Snyder was a student teacher who was denied her degree after she 
posted a picture of herself on MySpace wearing a pirate cap and holding a plastic cup with the 
caption, “drunken pirate.” Id. at *6.  
 65. See supra text accompanying notes 27–28. 
 66. See, e.g., Mark Schroeder, Keeping the “Free” in Teacher Speech Rights: Protecting 
Teachers and Their Use of Social Media To Communicate with Students Beyond the School-
house Gates, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 5, ¶ 200 (2013). 
 67. Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1617. Papandrea also raises the question of whether it is 
even necessary for non-work-related speech to meet the public concern requirement. Id.  
 68. Patricia M. Nidiffer, Comment, Tinkering with Restrictions on Educator Speech: Can 
School Boards Restrict What Educators Say on Social Networking Sites?, 36 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 115, 125 (2010); see also Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1620 (arguing that it will be diffi-
cult for many social media cases to meet the public concern requirement). By virtue of being 
a threshold requirement, the public concern element of course makes it more difficult for a 
court to deem speech protected. However, several courts in recent teacher speech cases have 
assumed that the speech is a matter of public concern, while ultimately denying the retaliation 
claim on the Pickering balance. See infra note 71 and accompanying text. Thus, it may be that 
the Pickering balance is more of a hurdle to teachers than the Connick threshold requirement. 
 69. See infra text accompanying note 98. This criticism is one of the main issues that this 
Note addresses. 
 70. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 470 (3d Cir. 2015) (“[W]e reluctantly 
assume for the purposes of this opinion that Munroe’s speech satisfied the ‘public concern’ 
requirement.”). 
 71. See, e.g., Richerson v. Beckon, 337 F. App’x 637, 638 (9th Cir. 2009) (“We assume, 
without deciding, that at least some of Richerson’s speech was of public concern . . . .”); 
Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 196 (2d Cir. 2003) (“For purposes of Melzer’s claims, 
we assume arguendo that his activity centers on a matter of public concern, and is thus pro-
tected.” (italics in original)).   
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court’s unwillingness to decide definitively whether the speech addressed a matter 
of public concern indicates discomfort applying the doctrine in this context. This Part 
highlights two problems with the public concern requirement in teacher social media 
cases: (1) the scope of the speech that the court examines, and (2) the role that media 
attention should play in the court’s analysis. 
A. The Scope of the Court’s Examination: “Cherry Picking”? 
To determine whether speech is a matter of public concern, Connick provided 
vague guidelines that require courts to examine the “content, form, and context of a 
given statement, as revealed by the whole record.”72 But social media speech com-
plicates this inquiry: How broad is the “whole record”? If the contested speech comes 
from one particular Facebook post, should the court examine just that post, or should 
it examine the entire Facebook page? Because Facebook pages often contain both 
protected and unprotected speech,73 the scope of what the court analyzes can be de-
terminative. Social media presents problems that traditional media does not. Com-
pared to Facebook speech, it may well be easier to determine whether a single edito-
rial, for instance, addresses a matter of public concern as a whole.74  
Attempting to follow Connick’s guidelines, the Third Circuit has applied a “no 
cherry picking” rule, meaning that the court cannot “cherry pick” speech that is of 
public concern while ignoring its overall form and context.75 Part II.A critiques the 
“no cherry picking” rule, arguing that it is not necessarily a logical product of 
Connick.76  Part II.A then underscores the relevant problems in Munroe77 before ad-
dressing the larger implications for social media free speech cases.78 
1. Historical Inconsistency of the “Cherry Picking” Prohibition 
Superficially, the “no cherry picking” rule properly adheres to the Connick 
standard: A court must examine the entire record rather than mere portions of it.79 
Munroe relies on authority from Connick and its progeny for the proposition that 
courts cannot “cherry pick” while ignoring the overall context of the speech.80 
While the “no cherry picking” rule has roots in Connick, a close reading of the 
case reveals that the Connick Court itself “cherry picked.” In Connick, an assistant 
district attorney opposed her impending transfer to another office and discussed the 
                                                                                                             
 
 72. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).  
 73. Emily McNee, Note, Disrupting the Pickering Balance: First Amendment Protections 
for Teachers in the Digital Age, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1818, 1838 (2013). 
 74. Id. at 1839. 
 75. See, e.g., Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467. 
 76. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 77. See infra Part II.A.2. 
 78. See infra Part II.A.3. 
 79. See supra text accompanying note 72. 
 80. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 467  (“We can not ‘cherry pick’ something that may impact the 
public while ignoring the manner and context in which that statement was made or that public 
concern expressed. Our inquiry must also consider the form and circumstance of the speech in 
question.” (quoting Miller v. Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
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matter with her superior.81 In response to her superior’s suggestion that other col-
leagues did not share her concerns, the assistant district attorney created and distrib-
uted a questionnaire to her colleagues that included a variety of matters: the office’s 
transfer policy, office morale, a possible grievance committee, the level of confi-
dence in supervisors, and any perceived pressure to work in political campaigns.82 
With one exception, the court concluded that the questionnaire did not contain mat-
ters of public concern. The exception was the question whether employees “ever feel 
pressured to work in political campaigns on behalf of office supported candidates.”83 
Only analyzing that single question, the Court conducted the Pickering balance.84 By 
doing so, the Connick Court “cherry picked” a question that addressed a matter of 
public concern from the rest of the survey questions. This isolation is exactly what 
other courts have interpreted Connick to prohibit.  
2. Application and Problems in Munroe 
 Because the prohibition on “cherry picking” is not well rooted, it is unsurprising 
that the court in Munroe struggled in applying it. The Munroe court noted that the 
school district made a “strong case” for why the speech failed to meet the public 
concern requirement.85 Munroe stated that she blogged to keep up with friends and 
that most of her posts were not work related.86 Moreover, the school district stressed 
“rather persuasively” that Munroe used her blog “to vent personal grievances or 
express her visceral reaction to her daily experiences.”87  
Even though the school district’s analysis conforms to Connick’s mandate of an-
alyzing the “content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole 
record,”88 the Munroe court “reluctantly assume[d]” that Munroe’s speech met the 
public concern requirement.89 The court’s assumption is surprising given its obser-
vation that “Munroe’s various comments about her students arguably were no differ-
ent than, inter alia, her restaurant critique.”90 In so commenting, the court implicitly 
recognized that the blog overall was a forum for venting. Yet it proceeded to “cherry 
pick” particular posts—isolated from the overall context—to support its “reluctant 
assumption.” The court reasoned that Munroe’s list of proposed report card com-
ments91 was included in a post that also criticized the school’s grading system, and 
so the post “ultimately involved more” than personal grievances against her students 
or the administration.92 Although it may be true that this post in particular “ultimately 
involved more” than personal grievances, that does not mean that the overall thrust 
                                                                                                             
 
 81. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 140 (1983). 
 82. Id. at 141.  
 83. Id. at 148–49.  
 84. Id. at 149–50, 154. 
 85. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469. 
 86. Id. at 458.  
 87. Id. at 469 (quoting Brief for Appellees at 32, Munroe, 805 F.3d 454 (No. 14-3509)).  
 88. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48. 
 89. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 470. 
 90. Id.  
 91. See supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text.  
 92. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 470. 
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of the post addresses a matter of public concern. Even if the court is correct—that 
the particular post addresses a matter of public concern—the court cannot examine 
any one post in isolation without violating the “no cherry picking” rule. Moreover, 
the court noted that “there were, at the very least, occasional blog posts that touched 
on broader issues like academic integrity, honor, and the importance of hard work.”93 
In singling out “occasional” blog posts as addressing matters of public concern, the 
court, by definition, “cherry picked.”94  
Why did the Munroe court “cherry pick” after explicitly stating that it could not 
“cherry pick”?95 Perhaps the court implicitly recognized that the social media con-
text, because of its vastness, necessitates “cherry picking.” As Munroe argued, it does 
not make sense for the court to consider posts on “mundane topics like pie recipes 
and movie reviews” because such posts are unrelated to what allegedly triggered the 
school’s employment action.96 Although Munroe’s argument is logical—as the em-
ployee must show a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory action and the 
protected speech—the court immediately noted that it could not “cherry pick” the 
particular posts that likely triggered the employment action.97  
3. Implications in the Social Media Context 
As exemplified in Munroe, one of the primary issues in a court’s analysis is 
defining the “whole record.” The greater the breadth, the greater the odds are that 
particular speech will contain both public and private elements.98 Social media, un-
like traditional print, is potentially infinite. As one scholar points out, “social media 
involves extensive amounts of rapidly changing, interactive speech.”99 Social media 
users can publish an endless number of posts with a click of a button.100 Given the 
continual opportunity to post—whether from one’s computer or one’s phone—dis-
cerning the overall thrust of something so vast is potentially difficult.  
Perhaps in recognition of this immense task, several courts have engaged in 
“cherry picking.” For example, the court in In re O’Brien only analyzed two of the 
teacher’s statements on Facebook: (1) “I’m not a teacher—I’m a warden for future 
criminals!” and (2) “They had a scared straight program in school—why couldn’t [I] 
bring [first] graders?”101 The court made no mention of other Facebook posts, 
                                                                                                             
 
 93. Id. (emphasis added).  
 94. An example is when the court referenced a “critical” post in which Munroe discussed 
the grading process to support its conclusion that the public concern requirement was met. Id. 
 95. “[I]t is also well established that (as we explained in Miller) the courts ‘can not “cherry 
pick” something that may impact the public while ignoring the manner and context in which 
that statement was made or that public concern expressed.’” Id. at 469 (quoting Miller v. 
Clinton Cnty., 544 F.3d 542, 550 (3d Cir. 2008)).  
 96. Id. Similarly, the defendants focused on the student-related posts in particular. Id.  
 97. Id.  
 98. Schroeder, supra note 66, ¶ 192. 
 99. Id. ¶ 191. 
 100. See id. (“[A]bout 62% of Facebook users update their status at least once every two 
weeks. Most Facebook users comment on other users’ statuses even more frequently, at least 
one to two days per week.”).  
 101. In re O’Brien, No. 108–5/11, 2013 WL 132508, at *1 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 
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although it is unlikely that these were the only two Facebook posts on the teacher’s 
page. Hemminghaus v. Missouri102 is another example where the court “cherry 
picked.” In Hemminghaus, a court reporter for a state circuit court judge published 
blog posts regarding her pending case against a nanny who allegedly abused the re-
porter’s children.103 Although the court reporter’s posts discussed the details of her 
own case, the court held that the speech, “at least in part,” addressed a matter of 
public concern.104 Clearly, the fact that at least some of her speech did not address a 
matter of public concern was not fatal to the reporter’s challenge.105  
As O’Brien and Hemminghaus illustrate, not all courts apply the “no cherry pick-
ing” rule, and for good reason. The rule restricts courts’ ability to hone in on the 
speech that is actually relevant to the retaliation action in a potentially vast sea of 
information. Moreover, the prohibition on “cherry picking” does not align with how 
the Connick Court actually analyzed the form and context of the speech.106  
B. The Role of Media Attention: A Red Herring? 
In determining whether speech meets the public concern requirement, some courts 
have considered the media attention that the subject of the speech has received.107 In 
a way, analyzing the surrounding media attention is logical. As the Supreme Court 
in City of San Diego v. Roe stated, a matter of public concern is “a subject of 
legitimate news interest,” meaning “a subject of general interest and of value and 
concern to the public at the time of publication.”108 Although it may make sense in 
some instances to measure the media attention received in the public concern 
                                                                                                             
 
11, 2013) (alterations in original). Another example where the court “cherry picked” is 
Spanierman v. Hughes, in which the court noted that a teacher’s MySpace page contained 
diverse content, including the teacher’s comments to other users, comments from other users 
to the teacher, pictures, blogs, and poetry. 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310 (D. Conn. 2008). Although 
the court held that virtually all of the teacher’s MySpace did not address matters of public 
concern, one part did address a matter of public concern—the teacher’s poem about his oppo-
sition to the Iraq War. Id. at 310–11. True to the Connick Court’s analysis, the Spanierman 
court held that the poem is protected speech. Id. 
 102. 756 F.3d 1100 (8th Cir. 2014).  
 103. Id. at 1111. 
 104. Id. at 1111–12.  
 105. Craig v. Rich Township High School District 227 provides a similar example outside 
of the social media context. 736 F.3d 1110 (7th Cir. 2013). In Craig, the court held that a 
guidance counselor’s book entitled It’s Her Fault met the public concern requirement—even 
if parts “viewed in isolation” would not. Id. at 1117. While the book contained sexually ex-
plicit language and addressed provocative topics, the court determined that the book, as a 
whole, “addresses adult relationship dynamics, a subject that interests a significant segment of 
the public.” Id. Although the court purported to conduct an analysis similar to that in Miller 
and in Munroe, it actually mirrored that of O’Brien and Hemminghaus. “The fact that Craig's 
book dealt with a subject of general interest to the public was enough to establish prima facie 
First Amendment protection.” Id. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 83–84.  
 107. See, e.g., Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 444 F.3d 158, 165 (2d 
Cir. 2006). 
 108. 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). 
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analysis, how news disseminates in the modern age may potentially obscure the 
speech’s true nature.109 Part II.B critiques the Munroe court’s analysis of media at-
tention110 and analyzes the larger implications of media attention in the public con-
cern analysis.111  
1. Application and Problems in Munroe 
Quickly after Munroe suffered adverse employment action, the national media 
picked up her story with gusto.112 According to Munroe, she gave several interviews 
to defend her entries and to focus attention on the nebulous “[e]ducation [d]ebate.”113 
The court concluded that “the extensive media coverage of [Munroe’s] blog and the 
statements she made to the media generally indicated that Munroe met the ‘public 
concern’ element.”114 However, the court expressed skepticism that the news cover-
age had significant bearing on the public concern question. The court was “troubled” 
for two reasons: first, that Munroe’s primary motivation in the interviews was to 
defend herself, and second, that the record contained little-to-no evidence regarding 
the content of the interviews apart from Munroe’s description of them.115 Addition-
ally, the court made a persuasive point—albeit hidden in a footnote—that it was pos-
sible that the public did not actually care about Munroe’s views on the “education 
debate,” but rather was interested in the blog posts and whether teachers can or 
should make such comments.116 Indeed, most Internet headlines about Munroe do 
not indicate a concern for modern education117 or anything resembling Munroe’s 
comments about academic integrity.118  
                                                                                                             
 
 109. See infra text accompanying notes 137–38. 
 110. See infra Part II.B.1. 
 111. See infra Part II.B.2. 
 112. See supra text accompanying notes 9–10.  
 113. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 470 (3d Cir. 2015). The court did 
not provide any further explanation for what the “Education Debate” entails.  
 114. Id. at 470–71. 
 115. Id. at 470.  
 116. Id. at 471 n.8. 
 117. For example, an ABC headline was Teacher Defends Insulting Blog Posts About Her 
Students: ‘I Hear the Trash Company Is Hiring.’ Canning & Katrandjian, supra note 9; see 
also Edecio Martinez, Natalie Munroe Blog: Pa. Teacher Suspended over Online Blasts at 
Students, CBS NEWS (Feb. 16, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/natalie 
-munroe-blog-pa-teacher-suspended-over-online-blasts-at-students/ [https://perma.cc/9GAD-
B225]; Jillian Eugenios, Teacher Who Called Students ‘Loathsome,’ ‘Rat-Like’ Is Fired, 
TODAY.COM: NEWS (June 28, 2012, 10:25 AM), http://www.today.com/id/47994422/ns/today 
-today_news/t/teacher-who-called-students-loathsome-rat-like-fired/#.WMme9c6yxlo [https:// 
perma.cc/B3WW-BF5U]. But see Vicki Glembocki, Natalie Munroe: A Tale of a Teacher in 
the Digital Age, PHILA. MAG (Apr. 29, 2011), http://www.phillymag.com/articles/natalie 
-munroe-a-tale-of-a-teacher-in-a-digital-age/5/ (discussing how Munroe is “trying to change 
education”) [https://perma.cc/2JF2-6WGY].  
 118. See Munroe, 805 F.3d at 461 (“TWO days after my lofty speeches, and a single day 
after they all signed the [honesty] pledge and pledge wall . . . someone [described as ‘“that girl 
in the back in pink”’] had consciously made a cheat sheet and brought it in and intended to 
cheat.” (alterations in original)).  
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The dissent in Munroe makes a similar point, arguing that the interviews undoubt-
edly addressed a matter of public concern because Munroe’s interviews focused on 
an ongoing debate: suspending teachers for criticizing their students online and the 
“harsh realities of the 21st century classroom.”119 However, the dissent confuses the 
public’s reaction to the post and the content of the posts themselves—which had 
nothing to do with how teachers should behave on social media and how schools 
should respond. If Munroe had blogged about how teachers are disciplined for their 
social media speech, the dissent’s argument would be persuasive. However, Munroe 
made no such comments.  
Although the Munroe court’s discussion of Munroe’s media attention is brief, the 
court’s affirmation that the media attention had bearing on the public concern ques-
tion reveals that it is still something that courts consider. Even so, the court is reluc-
tant to place much weight on media attention. Especially in light of the court’s ques-
tionable assumption that Munroe’s speech met the public concern requirement,120 it 
seems that the Munroe court grasped to find support for its assumption. Examining 
the current state of the media may help uncover why the court hesitated to give media 
attention much analytical significance.  
2. Implications in the Social Media Context 
Social media has changed the face of journalism.121 Instead of reading only what 
editors picked for the front page, many people read what pops up on their social 
network accounts.122 What pops up on social media depends, in large part, on what 
social media “friends” find interesting.123 And disseminating information on social 
media is easy; it only requires a click of a button.124 As a result, social media allows 
                                                                                                             
 
 119. Id. at 483 (Ambro, J., dissenting) (quoting Kayla Webley, How One Teacher’s Angry 
Blog Sparked a Viral Classroom Debate, TIME (Feb. 18, 2011), http://content.time.com 
/time/nation/article/0,8599,2052123,00.html [https://perma.cc/WC5M-APQF]).  
 120. Id. at 470.  
 121. See Lili Levi, Social Media and the Press, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1531, 1535–39 (2012) 
(describing the decline of traditional print media); see also Ryan Holmes, Facebook vs. Twitter 
vs. Snapchat: Who Will Win the News Wars?, LINKEDIN (Oct. 14, 2015), https:// 
www.linkedin.com/pulse/facebook-vs-twitter-snapchat-who-win-news-wars-ryan-holmes. Since 
2009, viewership on top U.S. networks has dropped 19%. Id.  
 122. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1550–51 (“Readers do not automatically rely on the edi-
torial judgment of professional newspaper editors even to create the front page. Instead, they 
depend on their friends and social media networks to recommend what news to follow.”); 
Brian E. Weeks & R. Lance Holbert, Predicting Dissemination of News Content in Social 
Media: A Focus on Reception, Friending, and Partisanship, 90 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. 
Q. 212, 214 (2013) (describing how traditional communication through mass media is a “one-
way, top-down, sender-driven, time-specific activity,” whereas social media communication 
involves consumer choice).  
 123. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1550–51. 
 124. Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 214. Weeks and Holbert contrast the conven-
ience of using social media to disseminate news with the more “onerous” task of sharing con-
tent using traditional media. Id. Compare sharing a news story on Facebook with clipping 
stories out of newspapers to share with friends. See id.  
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immediate “viralization and amplification” of information.125 
The combination of bottom-up consumer choice and easy dissemination of in-
formation raises an important question: Does vast media attention indicate that the 
content spread is of “legitimate news interest?”126 In other words, is what goes viral 
truly “newsworthy”?127 Jonah Berger’s and Katherine L. Milkman’s seminal study 
provides valuable insight.128 From a psychological perspective, the study aimed to 
determine what makes something “go viral.”129 Berger and Milkman found that posi-
tive content tends to be more viral than negative content.130 However, their results 
were more complex than a binary positive/negative divide. Berger and Milkman 
broke positive and negative emotions down further into levels of “activation”:  
Sadness, anger, and anxiety are all negative emotions, but while sadder 
content is less viral, content that evokes more anxiety or anger is actually 
more viral. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis about how 
arousal shapes social transmission. Positive and negative emotions char-
acterized by activation or arousal (i.e., awe, anxiety, and anger) are posi-
tively linked to virality, while emotions characterized by deactivation 
(i.e., sadness) are negatively linked to virality.131 
If Berger and Milkman are correct, what garners media attention has less to do with 
the content itself and more to do with the type of emotion the content evokes—which 
in turn affects what is shared. And what individuals choose to share shapes what 
becomes viral in public discourse.132 
Berger’s and Milkman’s study has important implications for litigation involving 
social media. Stories that provoke high levels of emotion are more likely to get lots 
of circulation. This is exactly what happened in Munroe’s case. Her blog “went 
viral,” which led to an extreme public reaction in which students and parents voiced 
“shock and outrage” that Munroe wrote such “derogatory” comments.133 As one 
scholar noted, “to the extent that the selection of stories is influenced by trending on 
Twitter, it is possible that attention will be distracted by ‘superheated’ stories whose 
relative importance is not assessed.”134 For example, a 2011 study of trending on 
                                                                                                             
 
 125. Levi, supra note 121, at 1553. Note that sharing on social media often snowballs into 
more sharing using this venue. See Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 215 (“The more 
frequently people receive news via social media, the more likely they are to disseminate it 
within that same environment.”).  
 126. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 127. See Levi, supra note 121, at 1565–66 (discussing what is considered “newsworthy” 
in the modern age in relation to what is “trending” on Twitter).  
 128. Berger & Milkman, supra note 22.  
 129. Id. at 192. 
 130. Id. at 199. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 201; see also Weeks & Holbert, supra note 122, at 213 (“What makes social 
media a unique platform for news is the ability it affords citizens to now act as efficient content 
distributors, and it is necessary to understand if and when people disseminate news in this 
digital environment.”).  
 133. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 463, 469 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 134. Levi, supra note 121, at 1566. 
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Twitter found that news about Justin Bieber was more popular than news about world 
affairs.135  
While public concern is not measured by its “importance,”136 factors apart from 
the content of the speech itself may potentially obscure why something is getting 
media attention.137 The problem is acute in social media cases like Munroe’s, where 
the teacher makes offensive comments about his or her students, because these cases 
are attention grabbing and tend to evoke strong reactions.138 There is a danger that 
courts will conflate “newsworthiness” with “virality,” thus placing the focus on the 
public’s reaction to the speech rather than the speech itself.  
III. BEST WAY TO APPLY THE PUBLIC CONCERN DOCTRINE 
Given the rise of social media, a reexamination of the public concern requirement 
is necessary. While the particular “speech” that a court analyzes often contains more 
than one statement, the number of statements involved in social media cases is likely 
to be much more expansive than in traditional media. Moreover, as individuals post 
ever more frequently on a variety of websites regarding a variety of topics, it becomes 
easier to share news within social media platforms.  
Courts must take these changes into account when analyzing whether the public 
concern requirement is met in social media cases. This Part suggests how courts 
should tweak their analyses of the public concern requirement in the social media 
age. First, Part III.A proposes that courts narrow the scope of the particular speech 
they examine.139 Then, Part III.B suggests that courts should give little consideration, 
if any, to the amount of media attention that the speech receives.140  
A. Courts Must Narrow the Scope of the Particular Speech They Examine 
As the Third Circuit’s opinion in Munroe makes evident, determining whether 
speech on social media meets the public concern requirement can be difficult. The 
main source of trouble is the potential breadth of online speech. In Munroe, the court 
faced a variety of topics, from favorite foods,141 to frustrating students,142 to modern 
                                                                                                             
 
 135. Id. at 1565–66. 
 136. Craig v. Rich Twp. High Sch. Dist. 227, 736 F.3d 1110, 1116 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he 
speech need not address a topic of great societal importance, or even pique the interest of a 
large segment of the public, in order to be safeguarded by the First Amendment.”).  
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 116–18. 
 138. See supra text accompanying note 133; see also Berger & Milkman, supra note 22, 
at 214 (“More emotional, positive, interesting, and anger-inducing and fewer sadness-inducing 
stories are likely to make the most blogged list. Notably, the effect of practical utility reverses: 
Although a practically useful story is more likely to make the most e-mailed list, practically 
useful content is marginally less likely to be blogged about. This may be due in part to the 
nature of blogs as commentary.” (emphasis omitted)).  
 139. See infra Part III.A. 
 140. See infra Part III.B. 
 141. Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch. Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 458 (3d Cir. 2015). 
 142. Id.  
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music.143 To reduce the extent of the speech that courts must deal with—and to zero 
in on the speech that is germane—courts should focus on specific online posts rather 
than the social media page’s entirety.  
A separate analysis for each post would make it easier for courts to classify the 
speech properly. Instead of having to determine the overall thrust of a potentially 
broad array of materials,144 in most cases courts could focus on a modest amount of 
speech.145 This narrow focus would reduce the instances where the court would have 
to make sweeping, perhaps arbitrary, statements about the overall thrust of the 
speech.146  
Moreover, courts can focus on posts that are reasonably relevant to the employ-
ment action.147 By focusing on posts that reasonably could have played a role in the 
school’s termination decision, a court would not need to examine every single one 
of an individual’s Facebook posts from the page’s inception. Which speech played a 
role in the employment action may not be abundantly clear in all cases, but it likely 
would not be difficult for the courts to eliminate evidently irrelevant speech.148 It is 
important to remember that establishing that the speech was protected is only a pre-
liminary step in a successful retaliation claim; the employee must also show that 
there was a causal connection between the alleged retaliatory action and the protected 
speech.149 If it is obvious that parts of a blog bear no relation to the employment 
decision, there is little value in the court deciding whether those parts met the public 
concern requirement.150 
Even though examining individual posts separately has its benefits, sometimes 
examining the webpage’s broader context is a useful analytical tool. Social media 
can be used to tell a narrative. According to Munroe, her blog was “replete with 
references to her life’s experience as an English teacher in an affluent, suburban 
Philadelphia School District.”151 The general themes throughout a social media page 
                                                                                                             
 
 143. Id. at 460. 
 144. See Schroeder, supra note 66, ¶ 191 (“A typical Facebook page, for example, contains 
numerous text postings and a variety of pictures and videos. These postings likely involve 
some political or religious speech as well as speech on personal matters.”).  
 145. Reducing the scope of what the court examines makes the social media speech more 
finite, more like a single editorial. See supra text accompanying notes 73–74. 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 92–93. 
 147. Munroe argued that the court should not examine every single one of her posts be-
cause some were clearly not a part of the controversy. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469. Her posts on 
pie recipes, for example, obviously bore no relation to the employment action against Munroe. 
See id.  
 148. See id.  
 149. See supra text accompanying note 53.  
 150. In Spanierman v. Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008), the court 
“cherry picked” portions of the teacher’s MySpace page. The court held that only the teacher’s 
poem about the Iraq War was protected, and thus continued the analysis. Id. The court found 
no evidence of a causal connection between the poem and the school’s employment decision. 
Id. Because complaints about the teacher’s page had to do with his “very peer-to-peer like” 
posts as well as pictures of naked men, it seems silly for the court to waste words in its opinion 
analyzing the political poem. Id. at 298.  
 151. Munroe, 805 F.3d at 469 (quoting Brief and Appendix for Appellant at 23, Munroe, 
805 F.3d 454 (No. 14-5309)).  
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could conceivably provide insight into the nature of a particular post or posts. Per-
haps a court could examine a cluster of posts together when their nature is truly am-
biguous. But it is unnecessary to discern the webpage’s overall theme regarding posts 
that are obviously unrelated to the theme. The purpose of examining posts separately 
is to excise certain topics from the court’s analysis that clearly have no bearing on 
the employment decision. Allowing courts to escape the “overall thrust” analysis for 
the entire page would save time and words.  
B. Media Attention Should Play a Minimal Role in the Public Concern Analysis 
Although the court in Munroe did not spend a great deal of time discussing 
Munroe’s media attention, the fact that it focused on it at all may have been a mistake. 
Relying on media attention as support for its “reluctant[] assum[ption]” that the pub-
lic concern requirement was met,152 the court shifted focus from the blog’s content 
to the public’s reaction to it.153 Because considering media attention may obscure the 
analysis, courts should place little—if any—emphasis on the media surrounding the 
controversy within the public concern analysis.  
If courts do not consider the level of media attention, they will avoid problems of 
identifying what the media attention was really about. In Munroe, for example, the 
court grappled with the true reason why Munroe’s case was making such a splash. 
Did it have to do with the “education debate,”154 whether teachers should be fired for 
making such comments,155 the pure viciousness of the comments,156 or something 
else entirely? If the courts ignore the amount of media attention as a consideration, 
they will not have to discern whether the public reacted to the posted content itself.  
Although media attention may potentially confuse the analysis, media attention 
can play a legitimate role in assessing the public concern inquiry.157 The big question 
is whether media attention—which today often involves viral content—is an indica-
tion of newsworthiness. There is not a clear answer, but in some cases it seems that 
the answer is yes. It has been posited that the Black Lives Matter movement158 and 
the Egyptian Revolution159 would not have become as widespread without social 
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 153. See supra text accompanying note 114. 
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 157. For example, in Cioffi v. Averill Park Central School District, a school athletic direc-
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 158. See Katie Dupere, How Black Lives Matter Made the Leap from Social Media to So-
cial Action, MASHABLE (Sept. 19, 2016), http://mashable.com/2016/09/19/black-lives-matter 
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Uprising, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Feb. 8, 2011), http://www.democracynow.org/2011/2/8/asmaa 
2017] “TO HELL IN A HANDBASKET”  1633 
 
media platforms and the rise of “digital-enabled citizen journalism.”160 News 
surrounding the Egyptian Revolution went “viral” and likely contained “subject[s] 
of legitimate news interest.”161  
However, if the speech at issue involved events such as the Egyptian Revolution, 
a court would not likely need to resort to media attention in order to conclude that 
the speech constituted a matter of public concern.162 Instead, a court would more 
likely base its decision primarily on the content.163 In easier public concern inquiries, 
then, examining the role of media attention may not serve as a particularly useful 
tool.  
But what about when the public concern question is not clear-cut? In these in-
stances, courts may examine media attention to support a reasonable answer.164 
When there is uncertainty regarding why the speech garnered media attention, there 
is a greater concern that a reactionary media obscured the true nature of the speech—
perhaps by emphasizing certain aspects of the story that are more emotionally 
charged without delving into the speech’s actual content. Connick requires that the 
speech itself must address a matter of public concern to be protected.165 Thus, courts 
should not allow media attention to cloud the analysis and detract or distract from 
analyzing the speech at issue. 
CONCLUSION  
Given the difficulties that the public concern requirement poses, scholars have 
called for various solutions. Some scholars suggest that it is best to eliminate public 
concern from the public employee speech doctrine altogether.166 Others suggest shift-
ing the public concern element from a threshold requirement to a lesser role in the 
analysis. For example, public concern could be merely a factor in the balancing 
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 160. Holmes, supra note 121. 
 161. City of San Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 83–84 (2004) (per curiam). 
 162. Political expression is generally protected with little inquiry. See Spanierman v. 
Hughes, 576 F. Supp. 2d 292, 310–11 (D. Conn. 2008) (holding that the teacher’s poem about 
the Iraq War could constitute political expression, which would render it protected under the 
First Amendment).   
 163. As the court in Cioffi noted, “We do not mean to say that if there is no media interest 
in the subject matter of the employee’s speech that the speech is not of public concern. Rather 
in this case, the fact of actual public interest further convinces us that Cioffi’s communications 
touch upon matters of public concern.” Cioffi v. Averill Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 444 F.3d 158, 
165 (2d Cir. 2006).  
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 165. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1983).  
 166. See, e.g., Papandrea, supra note 16, at 1630 (noting that the public concern require-
ment allows the government to restrict speech without showing disruption); see also 
Schroeder, supra note 66, at ¶ 182 (arguing that the public concern requirement should be 
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test.167 While the public concern requirement has its faults, its purpose is still relevant 
today. The public concern requirement is a gate-keeping tool for federal court 
claims.168 Given the rise of social media and the unprecedented fact patterns that 
court must analyze,169 the public concern requirement may very well help keep cer-
tain claims out of the system.  
While judicial efficiency is important, reaching the correct result is imperative. 
Thus, how courts apply the public concern doctrine should be tweaked to account for 
unique aspects of social media. Social media pages that contain lots of posts—often 
unrelated to the litigation—make for a more difficult public concern analysis. To 
target relevant speech that will actually have bearing on the substantial motivation 
question and to alleviate a potentially daunting task,170 courts should analyze posts 
separately when answering the public concern question. Moreover, to avoid obscur-
ing the speech’s true nature, courts should avoid using related media attention as a 
factor in the public concern analysis. However the courts decide to analyze the public 
concern requirement in the future, they must continually reassess the doctrine to en-
sure that it makes sense considering ever-evolving platforms.  
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